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LET'S CALL THE WHOLE THING OFF?
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAUSM. By Dennis J. Goldford. 1 Cambridge
University Press, New York. 2005. Pp. xi, 305. $75.00 (hard);
$29.99 (paper).
Keith E. Whittington 2

"The only jurisprudence that has made it into the public
sphere is ... originalism." 3 Since the 1980s, conservative Presidents and legal intellectuals have very visibly insisted on original
meaning as the touchstone of constitutional interpretation. Lawyers in and around the Reagan Administration settled on
originalism as the essential core within the general conservative
rhetoric lambasting "judicial activism" and exhorting "strict constructionism" and then helped shape this general disposition into
a relatively concrete theory of constitutional interpretation and
judicial review. The conservative commitment to originalism at
least kept it on the political agenda and impressed it into the
public consciousness. Originalism fared less well in the scholarly
debates over constitutional theory in the 1980s, but it remains
one of the contenders as a large-scale theory of constitutional interpretation, and there is little question that historical inquiry
into original meaning remains a standard (if not decisive) mode
of constitutional argumentation.
It is perhaps a propitious time to return to the originalism
debates. The administration of President George W. Bush has
not mounted the same sort of public campaign for originalism
that the Meese Justice Department did, but that is in part because two decades after the founding of the Federalist Society
and the ill-fated nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court, the Bush administration can take originalism for granted
I. Associate Professor of Politics, Drake University.
2. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin, and Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
3. Clyde Spillenger, quoted in Jess Bravin, Change on the Supreme Court, WALL
ST. J., July 5, 2005, at A4.
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as part of its intellectual and political background. Confirmation
fights over conservative judicial appointments and continuing
controversy over the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence give originalism renewed prominence. Although for many
the originalism debates remain forever frozen in 1987, a "new
originalism" has been developing within the scholarship for
many years now and the dance of originalist proponents and critics requires some new moves. 4
Dennis Goldford's new book revisits the originalism debate
with a goal of getting past it. What is interesting about originalism for him is precisely how it illuminates general problems of
American constitutional theory. With a clear-eyed picture of the
Constitution, he argues, we can get beyond originalism and nonoriginalism and develop a constitutional theory that transcends
that old division. Goldford's proposed alternative, what he calls
"a theory of constitutional textuality," shares a great deal with
recent constitutional theorizing and is often quite illuminating,
of both the Constitution and constitutional theory (p. 10).
Somewhat surprisingly, I found myself largely in agreement with
the book, despite its being pitched primarily as a critique of
originalism. Perhaps this suggests that Goldford has transcended
the originalism debate after all, though I do not think so. There
is a great deal of theoretical common ground to be found out
there, but there are still important points of disagreement. It is
worth locating both. In order to do so, Part I of this review
summarizes Goldford's argument, Part II raises a problem of
constitutional authority that is not adequately answered in this
theory of constitutional textuality, and Part III sketches an approach that situates originalism within American constitutionalism, accommodating if not transcending originalism and
nonoriginalism.
I. GOLDFORD'S CRITIQUE OF ORIGINALISM AND

THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTUALITY
Much of the book is framed as a review of the originalism
debate and as a critique of originalism. For those looking for an
accessible introduction to that literature, Goldford is a reliable
and fair guide. While he provides critical commentary on the arguments that have been made by others (almost always siding

4.
(2004).

See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. &
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with the critics of originalism), this discussion does not significantly redefine the terms of the debate or significantly advance
its margins.
Goldford first introduces the "debate over originalism" as
the indirect exchange between Attorney General Edwin Meese
and Associate Justice William Brennan in 1985. While Meese
and allies such as Robert Bork accused those who would abandon the original meaning of the Constitution when engaging in
judicial review as engaging in naked politics, Brennan charged
that the originalists merely chose to disguise their politics. Goldford takes this charge quite seriously, and thus spends some time
attempting to identify "at least one instance in which originalists
acknowledge that a liberal result is generated by originalist interpretation," and thereby saving "originalism from originalists
themselves" (pp. 37, 38). He finds such a savior in Justice Hugo
Black, whose argument about the historical meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause proved able to
"yield liberal as well as conservative results" (p. 50). With the
example of Black before us, we are apparently in a position to
take originalism seriously as a theory of constitutional interpretation, partly freed from the taint of its association with conservative advocates.
With those preliminaries out of the way, Goldford divides
the debate over originalism into several distinct arguments. In
each, originalists and their critics are shown to embrace a series
of sharp dichotomies. Those dichotomies are then subverted to
show that each side has only a partial grip on the proper understanding of American constitutionalism. Whether in the context
of disagreements over a living constitution versus a fixed constitution, interpretation versus noninterpretation, objectivity versus
subjectivity, originalists are understood to be driven by the fear
of unconstrained judges exercising discretion to make policy
from the bench, and consequently the need for a set of fetters by
which judges can be tied down. Goldford ranges widely in presenting these debates. He does not limit himself to the most
prominent public or scholarly defenders of originalists but freely
pulls in historical judges and politicians, relatively obscure law
review articles, and those who might not be thought of as
originalists at all, such as Harry Jaffa. The criticisms of originalism are generally drawn from the expected sources.
For those seeking an overview of the ins and outs of the debate over originalism in the 1980s, the first several chapters of
The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism are
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a convenient source. The coverage can be somewhat idiosyncratic, however, and the focus is on the big dividing lines between originalists and their opponents rather than on the contours or development of originalism itself. Gregory Bassham's
Original Intent and the Constitution remains the essential source
for a comprehensive and analytically sharp overview of the
originalist theories of the 1980s. 5 Johnathan O'Neill has now
done for originalism what Laura Kalman did for "legal liberalism, " 6 providing a serious intellectual history of originalism from
the postwar period to the present. 7
The summary and critique of originalism is ultimately a secondary aim of the book, however. The primary purpose of the
extended journey through the originalism debates is to lay bare
some basic issues in American constitutionalism and to set up
Goldford's own response to those issues. This is a somewhat indirect path to the desired endpoint, encouraging some repetition
in the presentation (key arguments are repeated nearly verbatim
in several chapters). It also tends to focus attention on the criticism of originalism even though Goldford ultimately wants to reject both originalism and "nonoriginalism," and his departure
from nonoriginalism is left less apparent than it might otherwise
have been.
Goldford sees the modern originalism debate as more than
just an episode in Reagan-era politics. It is rather a manifestation of our recurring struggle with "the very nature of the
American constitutional system itself," the commitment to binding politics and the future with a written Constitution (p. 9).
Americans are "a people who live textually," but only to the extent that we allow society to be controlled by the "meaning of its
fundamental constitutive text" (p. 4). This way of social ordering
means that "political conflict over principles basic to and definitive of American society quite naturally finds expression in conflict over interpretation of the fundamental text that formalizes
those principles and renders them authoritative" (p. 3). But this
political dynamic gives rise to the anxiety that the Constitution
will become the plaything of political opponents, its meaning being erased and written over by political actors. We might, as Jefferson feared, "make it a blank paper by construction" (p. 9).
Rather than being the master of politics, the Constitution may
5. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1992).
6. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LmERALISM (1998).
7. JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, 0RIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLillCS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005).
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become its servant. Originalists may feel this anxiety most
strongly, and thus they have pressed particularly forcefully on
the need for a method of constitutional interpretation that will
limit judicial discretion and maintain constitutional fidelity.
Goldford is not persuaded by their response to that anxiety, but
he takes their concern seriously and sees it as lying at the heart
of the American constitutional project.
Goldford's dissatisfaction with originalism as an answer to
what it means to "live textually" is straightforward. It is the
commitment to constitutional interpretation- the willingness to
argue in constitutional terms and within the boundaries provided
by the constitutional text-that creates "textuality," the binding
of actual American politics by the constitutional text (p. 10). Although textuality requires that "what binds the future is the constitutional text," originalism requires instead that "what binds
the future is the original understanding of the constitutional
text" (p. 11). In their hearts, originalists do not trust "the binding
capacity of language," and so paradoxically fail to "take the
Constitution seriously" despite their stated desire to do just that
(p. 12). In their effort to preserve the Constitution, they try to
substitute something else for it, an "unwritten constitution"
drawn from the historical record (p. 244). They give up on the
Constitution itself and subtly abandon the constitutional project
of binding politics with a written text.
So what does living textually really mean? Ultimately,
Goldford argues, the Constitution achieves "social reality" not
through the dictate of the Court or of the founders but through
the social activity of the American people (p. 242). 8 Originalists,
according to Goldford, do not believe in "the constitutive character of the Constitution" and so instead assume that the Constitution has to be imposed on the people by judges (though presumably, much the same could be said about most normative
theories of constitutional interpretation) (p. 239). "Textuality"
operates through three constitutional roles. The Constitution is
"definitional" in that political debate employs the Constitution's
terms. It is "conserving" in that its existence "as an actual historical document" pulls that debate back to "that particular set
of general and specific principles with which the Framers constituted the American polity." It is "revolutionary" in that current
8. He endorses to this extent Karl Llewellyn's dictum: "there is only one way of
knowing whether, and how far, any portion of the Document is still alive; and that is to
watch what men are doing and how men feel, in the connection." Karl Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1934), quoted in Goldford (p. 249).
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political practices can be measured against those principles and
found wanting (p. 236). Goldford gives little attention to these
roles, however. Instead he emphasizes that what the founders
gave us is a "social text-the social practice of an ongoing constitutional convention" (p. 275). The Constitution can only be simultaneously democratic and binding if we view it as a constitutive document (that makes and is made by current social
practice) rather than as a positive document (that imposes an
order on social practice). Constitutional interpretation in this
constitutive mode gives up the idea that there are right answers
to constitutional questions or that constitutional interpretation
can be outside of politics. Living in the text only means engaging
in legitimate constitutional arguments, making use of the available constitutional grammar. Constitutional interpretation is
necessarily political, but it is a politics that must embrace "the
legitimacy of multiple argumentative positions" and refuse to accept "the idea of a privileged standpoint" from which to access
constitutional meaning (pp. 292, 293). Constitutionalism is all
about argument, about "difference and disagreement," but it is
apparently never about outcome (p. 202).
Goldford believes that this constitutional textuality would
transcend originalism and nonoriginalism. Both originalists and
nonoriginalists are equally guilty of trying to find "the right
normative standard governing interpretation," whether they are
trying to impose "the Framers' position" or "evolving moral
standards, John Rawls' theory of justice, and so on" on the text
(p. 194). Rather than trying to lock the language of the Constitution down, constitutional textuality calls on us simply to "participate as active subjects in the activity of constitutional meaning,"
to treat the "Constitution" as "a gerund rather than a noun" (p.
198). In doing so, we would necessarily be interpreting the Constitution that the founders left us, and all we can ever say about
that text is "this is our best reading of the Constitution." This is,
by now, a familiar move, pioneered, among others, by David
Couzens Hoy and Stanley Fish. 10 Goldford presses the point in a
particularly clear and strong fashion, however, and his final
chapters elaborate a sensibility about constitutionalism that is
both widespread in contemporary theory and in many ways quite
attractive. 1
9. David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism!Nonoriginalism
Distinction, 15 N. KENTUCKY L. REV. 479 (1988).
10. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989).
11. This focus on constitutional grammar rather than on constitutional require-
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II. THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY
Constitutional textuality is an attractive way to understand
constitutionalism. In an important sense, the Constitution is constitutive in the manner that Goldford highlights. If we are to experience the Constitution as something other than an alien imposition, and as a consequence if it is to have authority within
our politics, then we must recognize ourselves and our ideals in
that text and feel comfortable continuing to speak in its language. A "Constitution" that cannot be reconciled with our political reality is not a constitution at all; it is, at most, a fac;ade.
Perhaps, Jon Elster's metaphor should be reversed: The Constitution is not the lash that binds us to the mast, it is the siren's call
that draws us in to itself (though hopefully not to our doom). 12
The emphasis of the book on the theoretical significance of
the "interpretive turn" is also reasonable. There is a range of argumentative modes available within our accepted, legitimate
constitutional discourse. Any time we commit ourselves to interpreting the text of the Constitution, we have, to that extent,
committed ourselves to the founders' Constitution. There is no
authority to which we can appeal to settle our theoretical and interpretive debates; "all we have is the open sea of constitutional
discourse," and "all we have is our own persuasive powers" (p.
201).
The question is how far this pure constitutive approach to
the Constitution can take us. Goldford would have us not only
embrace the constitutive notion of the Constitution but also abjure the positivist notion of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, he
would say that we have no choice-the constitutive is all we
really have. That perspective, however, leaves us few resources
with which to understand some fairly basic features of American
constitutionalism. In particular, it leaves us with two unexplained
problems of authority.

rnents is central, for example, to PHILIP BOBBITf, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: niEORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1982); WILLIAM F. HARRis II, niE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION
(1993); HOWARD SCHWEBER, ni£ LANGUAGE OF LffiERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcorning). A kind of appeal to textualisrn can (almost) unite those across the interpretation
debate. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Believes in a Dead Constitution, SLATE, August 29, 2005 (www.slate.com/id/2125226).
12. Cf ]ON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1984).
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A. WHY THIS TEXT?
The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism
contends that constitutionalism should be understood simply as a
text-based social practice. It is the Constitution that "defines
who we are as a people not just in a symbolic sense, but, more
significantly, in a substantive sense" (p. 3). It is the "common
bond of American society" (p. 3). It is this text that we are committed to interpreting, and the legitimate moves of constitutional
discourse depend on our ability to make reference to the language of the Constitution. As we are repeatedly told, it is "the
Constitution itself" that is authoritative (p. 78).
We are not told why this text is authoritative. For the purposes of "textuality," any text will do, as long as we organize
ourselves around it. It could be the Holy Bible, old Star Trek
episodes, or "the Constitution" as written by two law professors.13 Why then is the Constitution in particular authoritative
for this community, and why is only the Constitution authoritative in this way? Why not the Gettysburg Address, the "I Have a
Dream" speech, or A Theory of Justice, in addition to or instead
of the Constitution? Why is the Constitution as a whole, as a unified document bounded by its preamble and its last amendment,
the relevant authoritative text? Why might we not select out favored bits and pieces of the document to give this authoritative
status while ignoring the rest? Why is the language of the founders binding on us, especially when we think that their intentions
in employing that language are not and especially if we think
that language is not only "definitional" but also communicative
of a "particular set of general and specific principles" (p. 236)?
An answer might be purely empirical. It may just happen
that the Constitution is our textual center. Those who would
analyze constitutions as coordination devices could accept this
answer. The Constitution's role is just a historical accident, the
text of 1787 just happens to be a particularly prominent focal
point around which we have coordinated our political activities
and now it would be costly to coordinate around something
else. 14 Of course, it would still be an empirical question as to
whether the Constitution actually serves that function, whether
in fact we take our cues as to who the legitimate next president is
13. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 465 (2000).
14. John Finnis, Law as Co-ordiTU.Uion, 2 RATIO JURIS 97 (1989); RUSSELL HARDIN,
LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140 (1999).
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based on the procedures laid out in Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment as opposed to, say, the consensus forecast of the
broadcast newscasters. It seems unlikely that Goldford would be
content with such an answer, however. He seems to want something less contingent and more normative. He recognizes that
the Constitution is authoritative, not merely convenient.
An alternative answer might be purely historicist. It is
enough to know that the present community has invested the
Constitution with this sort of authoritative meaning. The text to
which this community now consents to be governed could have
come from anywhere. It could have been found in a bottle on a
beach, inscribed on a tablet on a mountaintop, or left by a foreign prince. What would be important is not why the Constitution has such a status, but merely that it does now have such a
status. Its authoritativeness is a pretheorized given that has no
justification, a foundation on which the theory of textuality can
be built. This is not an uncommon position for similar sorts of
antifoundationalist theories, but it is a fairly precarious one to be
in. 15 If pressed to explain why we are a people defined by the
Constitution, however, Goldford's account offers little by way of
a response. We simply are the knights who say "Ni," the keepers
of the sacred words. 16
Even if we are willing to accept that, we are still faced with
the empirical question of whether the Constitution, the whole
Constitution, and nothing but the Constitution in fact serves this
political ordering role. To know which, if any, texts serve this
constitutive role for American society is fundamentally a sociological question, and there is no reason to assume a priori that
the Constitution is the sole, or even primary, text that performs
that function. 17 Tracing out the strategies of legitimation within
contemporary political discourse would likely give only a small
role to the Constitution.
There is a better answer as to why we take the Constitution
as a particularly authoritative text, but the answer requires stepping out of the contemporary constitutive framework within
15. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, 0BJECfiVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 175-96
(1990).
16. MONTY PYTHON, MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Columbia, 1975).
17. Cf MARK TuSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1999) (elevating in his "populist constitutional law" the "thin" constitution of the ideals associated
with the Declaration of Independence over the "thick" constitution of structures and
rules ~ssociate.d with the Cons~itution itself); ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS (1993)
(argumg that m the ConstitUtiOn "Arnencans become a people of the text" but finding
equally relevant a wide variety of sources in popular culture).
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which Goldford has confined himself. 18 The Constitution as a
unique, coherent text has special authority within our political
system because of the historical, positive act of its being ratified
by popular convention. This text is constitutive because of the
political authority of those who adopted it and, in so doing,
(re)founded the United States. To be sure, that project of constitutional founding might have failed. The Constitution of 1787
might have been rejected, replaced, or at some point abandoned.
That act of founding has continuing force only because of the actions of subsequent generations in accepting the founders' text
as their own. Nonetheless, the foundation of constitutional authority is positivist. 19
To the extent that we remain tethered to the "actual historical document" and it is this that we must interpret, as Goldford
says that we must, then it cannot really be true that we are in the
position of an "ongoing constitutional convention," as he also
claims (pp. 236, 275). Either the founders and their text have a
privileged position within our political discourse, or they do not.
If we are committed to interpreting their text (controlling for
amendments), then they have an authority as legislators that we
as interpreters do not have. We are called back to their text and
their principles as embodied in that text, and we are obliged to
take those as particularly authoritative (for certain purposes)
over alternative or conflicting texts or principles that we might
otherwise prefer and around which we might otherwise order
our social and political activities. To account for this, we need to
step out of the framework of free-form constitutive discourse
and reco15nize that the Constitution is regulative as well as constitutive. The Constitution is "an object" as well as a "social
practice," a noun as well as a gerund (cf. p. 198).

18. It is, of course, possible to reject the premise that the Constitution is uniquely
authoritative. We might argue instead, for example, that the opinions of the Supreme
Court or the consistent practice of government officials are equally or more authoritative
within our politics. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. au. L. REv. 877 (1996); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PENN. L. REv. 1 (1998). But that would be to reject Goldford's constitutional textuality.
19. See also, Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities
and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION (Andrei Marmor ed.,
1995); Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW (Robert P.
George ed., 1996).
20. See also, Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQ. 601,630 (2000).
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B. WHAT AUTHORIZES JUDGES TO ARBITRATE AMONG
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS?

The second problem of authority left unaddressed in The
American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism is that of
judges exercising the power of judicial review. It is a virtue, not a
vice, of the book that it revolves around constitutionalism, not
around judicial review. Most constitutional theory is driven by a
concern with judicial review and judge-made constitutional law,
and there is more to constitutionalism than just that. Nonetheless, it is a flaw in the book not to recognize that a great deal of
the originalism debate is driven by a particular concern with the
work of judges and how best to justify and guide their decisions
to lay aside the public policies endorsed by elected representatives. The originalism debate speaks to the nature of constitutional interpretation generally, but it is particularly motivated by
and concerned with constitutional interpretation within a very
specific institutional context. For both originalists and their critics, competing understandings about constitutional authority underwrite the institutional authority of the judiciary to speak for
the text and the particular approaches to constitutional interpretation that the courts might employ. 21 From the perspective of
that debate, any effort to transcend the division between
originalists and nonoriginalists will have to be evaluated by how
well it responds to the concerns that opened and sustain that divide. How well does textuality address the problem of judicial
review?
On the authority of judges to stamp the Constitution with
their particular interpretations of its meaning, Goldford is
largely silent. This is a conscious decision. He notes in his introduction that he thinks the originalism debate has been "erroneously conflated with the ... debate over judicial activism and judicial restraint" (p. 4). The question of "who in the American
political system is authorized to determine that X is contrary to
the Constitution" is entirely separate from the question of
"how-that is, by what criteria-does the authorized interpreter(s) determine that X is indeed contrary to the Constitution" (p. 5). Goldford offers no real argument for regarding
these questions as completeli' separable, but there is certainly a
superficial plausibility to it. 2 Knowing whether or not original21.

See also Robert Post, Theories of Constitution Interpretation, in LAW AND THE
(Robert Posted., 1991).
Goldford borrows the questions and their separation from Walter Murphy and

ORDER OF CULTURE

22.
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ism should guide our interpretations of the Constitution would
not by itself tell us whether or not we should have judicial review
or how deferential the judiciary should be when exercising the
power of constitutional review. An originalist Court might be active or passive, deferential or not. 23 Nonetheless, there might be
real connections between the "who" and the "how." We might
well think that differently situated actors might approach the
Constitution differently. Certainly we might think twice before
authorizing the Court to employ an approach to constitutional
interpretation that would explicitly transform the justices into an
"ongoing constitutional convention" (p. 275).
It has been decades since such talk of ongoing constitutional
conventions has commonly been used without either irony or derision. There is a reason why Goldford can engage in such talk
without apparent self-consciousness, and that is again because he
minimizes the regulative quality of the Constitution. When he
speaks of the first "fundamental" premise of American constitutionalism, that its purpose is "to bind future generations to the
vision of its founders," he understands that to mean something
very limited (p. 10).24 What the founders gave us is merely "argumentation and debate" (p. 275). In contrast to originalism, the
very exemplar of "a regulative theory of constitutional interpretation," Goldford's constitutional textuality is a purely constitutive theory (p. 11). It does not seek to bind the unwilling. There
is no apparent question of these understandings of constitutional
requirements being imposed on those who are dubious of them.
It does not need to grapple with the countermajoritarian difficulty. Quoting Hanna Pitkin, the "Constitution" in this constitutive sense is just "something we are" (p. 240). 25 As a presumptively constitutive text, the Constitution in this sense is almost
necessarily both "democratic" (it is what we are) and "binding"
(how could we be anything other than what we are?). We know
the Constitution by its works.
his co-authors (p. 5, n.13). WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, & WILLIAM F.
HARRIS III, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1986). See also, Walter F.
Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48
REV. POL. 401 (1986).
23. See also, Whittington, supra note 4.
24. It is worth noting that Goldford gives more normative weight to intergenerational constitutional binding than seems proper. The intergenerational survival of a piece
of constitutional text is purely contingent within American constitutionalism. In the first
instance, the goal of a constitutional constraint is not to bind our descendants but to bind
our government officials.
25. Quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL ED.
167, 167 (1987).
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How far can this constitutive approach carry us in understanding American constitutionalism? Part of the way, but not
all of the way, I believe. Perhaps more accurately, it can take us
a long way in understanding the nature of constitutionalism as
such but not very far in understanding a particular instantiation
of it, in this case in the form of the U.S. Constitution. In its particulars, the Constitution attempts to do more than order the political system and establish a grammar of political debate. It also
attempts to settle some actual or potential controversies, to establish right answers to some constitutional questions. It makes
some substantive commitments. In some cases, those commitments may be fairly specific, leaving little room for debate. In
other cases, those commitments may be less specific, leaving
more room for debate about how best to construe and apply
them. In either case, the Constitution seeks to regulate government action by ruling some options out of bounds, and it calls on
faithful constitutional interpreters to recognize those boundaries
and enforce them against those who are less meticulous or less
faithful. Daniel Webster represents one clear vein in the American constitutional tradition when scolding that a constitution
that did not establish limits that are either clear in themselves or
subject to authoritative resolution "should not be denominated a
constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics, for
everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to
any practical good, nor fit for any country to live under. "26
Within the discourse of American constitutionalism, there is a
consistent and appropriate demand for a method of constitutional interpretation that promises to get the Constitution right.
Both originalist and nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation seek to respond to that demand. Goldford's theory
of constitutional textuality does not.
Constitutional textuality may serve more adequately as an
external account of American constitutional discourse than as an
internal account that can be consciously deployed by the participants in that discourse. As an outside observer, we may well recognize that all interpretations are contingent, that it is discourse
"all the way down," that there are multiple modes of legitimate
constitutional argumentation, and that looking across history the
most notable constant is that there will be argument and debate.
As an inside participant in the process of constitutional interpre26.

6 REG. DEB. 78 (1830).
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tation, however, we may nonetheless be obliged to struggle as
best we can to identify what we take to be the right answers.
Goldford hints as much when he notes that "The written nature
of the American Constitution has contributed to the development of a legalistic, and thus more narrow, notion of constitutionalism centered on courts, but constitutional theory is an intellectual domain whose concern with general issues in
constitutionalism identifies it as more a species of social and political theory than of conventional constitutional law" (p. 240).
He offers constitutional textuality as a "descriptive and analytical argument about the nature of constitutional interpretation,"
as part of the effort "to put constitutions back into the empirical
concerns of political science and social theory," rather than as
"some alternative normative theory" (pp. 18, 19). This form of
constitutional theory, as "grand theory" or "meta-theory," can
be valuable. 27 But it can go astray when it steps out of the analytical mode and questions whether "we need a normative theory in the first place" (p. 18).Z8 When doing that it ceases to be
an academic alternative to participating in the originalism debate
and instead becomes an alternative within the originalism debate. But as an alternative within that debate-as a suggestion to
those who would do constitutional interpretation-constitutional
textuality provides little normative leverage for substantively or
procedurally resolving constitutional controversies.
III. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
But what should an originalist take away from the critiques
of originalism in The American Constitution and the Debate over
Originalism? I will not attempt to respond to those critiques in
detail. 29 I do, however, think that originalists should take Gold27. See also, Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of
Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509 (2000).
28. In doing so, it gives in to what Stanley Fish has called "theory hope," a false
expectation that the conclusions of metatheory ought to have consequences for theory.
FISH, supra note 10, at 324, 342. The fact that we know that individual interpreters operate within interpretive communities that help define what considerations are counted as
persuasive within them does not help us determine how any given interpretive community should function.
29. I have presented an extended argument for a version of originalism in KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). Goldford devotes a chapter to that argument
(pp. 208-34). Here, as elsewhere, the central thrust of Goldford's critique is that either
originalism is impossible (we cannot control our interpretation of one t~xt by reference
to other texts) or unavoidable (if we are interpreting, then we must be mterpretmg the
author's text). AJ; I argue in the book, I believe that while we may always be interpreting

2005]

BOOK REVIEWS

379

ford's central points seriously. His emphasis on the semantic
autonomy of the text is widely shared and weighty. His insistence that we recognize the constitutive character of the Constitution is well taken. The book helps direct us to where the real
theoretical disagreements between originalists and their critics
still are. 30 The originalist arguments of the 1980s were motivated
by the desire to restrain judges and were often framed in terms
of interpretation versus noninterpretation, but as eventually became clear most scholars were willing to claim the label of "interpretation" and the subjective experience of "constraint" was
hardly the issue.
As the questions raised in Part II above suggest, the central
issues may well relate to the problem of political authority. Recent theorizing about originalism (which should probably be distinguished from political agitation about originalism) has been
motivated less by concerns about judicial discretion than about
what the sources of constitutional authority are taken to be and
what is required for constitutional fidelity given those understandings. Less evident but related, I think, is disagreement
about what the purpose of judicially enforceable constitutional
rules are. Arguably, originalists tend to think the purpose of such
rules is to prevent political powerholders (whether understood
as electoral majorities or particular government officials) from
exercising that power in ways that are not constitutionally authorized, whereas their critics tend to think the purpose of such
rules is to prevent wrongful or unjust action simply.
Here again I think we need to reintroduce the institutional
complexity of our constitutional system, a complexity that Goldford largely ignores. In setting aside the issue of judicial review
and the "narrow" constitutionalism of the courts, Goldford
the author's text, we will do a better job of it if we are clear about who the relevant "author" is. Or, as Larry Alexander has observed, it may be "redundant to speak of that
Fred's original determinations," but it does matter who "Fred" is. Larry Alexander,
Originalism, or Who Is Fred?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 321, 325 (1996). Goldford
observes that "originalism and theories of indeterminacy are locked in an embrace with
each other, bound in their shared premise of the importance of authorial intent" to confining the possibilities of textual meaning (p. 219). Of course, in practice we do not experience texts as indeterminate in this way, except when subjected to deconstructionist
analysis. But from the fact that we naturally settle on some determinate understanding of
the text, it does not follow that we will settle on the correct understanding unless we are
guided by the appropriate considerations when interpreting. Originalism and
nonoriginalism disagree about what those appropriate considerations are. Goldford's
textuality suggests that any consideration is appropriate.
30. In applying originalism in any given case, there may well remain real practical
questions as to how far available historical materials might take one in resolving the contested meaning of a given text.
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speaks instead of an undifferentiated "we as a polity" who interpret and are bound by the Constitution (pp. 240, 285). When he
says that "we" simultaneously consent to and are bound by the
Constitution in the process of textuality, it is this undifferentiated we that is in play (pp. 10-13). In describing how the Constitution operates as a constitutive rather than a regulative rule, he
emphasizes that nothing political exists in a form that "predates"
the Constitution, nothing stands outside of it for it to regulate (p.
268). Instead, like a bishop in a chess game, all the "institutions,
relations, and procedures" of both the government and "the
people" are "constituted by and are 'logically dependent on' the
Constitution" (p. 269). Unlike a chess piece, however, political
actors are autonomous agents with real power at their disposal.
The president's authority may be "logically dependent on" the
Constitution (though even this is too formalistic, as political
leaders including the president draw authority from a variety of
sources including "electoral mandates," popular approval and
personal charisma), but his power is not. We wish to deploy the
Constitution not merely to bind "us" or "future generations,"
but most importantly to bind current government officials who
might exercise their power in ways that are at odds with our own
sense of the constitutional requirements. To focus on the constitutive to the exclusion of the regulative can miss the ways in
which we not only enact the Constitution through our actions
but also struggle over it.
Although originalists might well insist that the proper goal
of those interpreting the Constitution is to realize the meaning
that was imbued in that text by the founders, they should also
recognize that such interpretive efforts will not exhaust what can
be done with the text. Originalists qua originalists are only concerned with the bare minimum of how we must live if we are to
adhere to the requirements of the Constitution. That bare minimum may be easy or hard to satisfy, but it is what the Constitution was written to demand of government officials. It may or
may not be easy to determine what those requirements are, or
what their implications are for the case at hand, but the standard
for evaluating proffered interpretations of them is whether they
realize the requirements established by those with the authority
to dictate the fundamental law. For the Court, the appeal to the
original meaning of the Constitution provides a ready basis for
its own authority to review and set aside the policies of other
government officials. Originalism offers a refuge for judges from
having to make a direct appeal to controversial value judgments,
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challenging other officials to either submit to the judicial interpretation, to offer their own better interpretation of the original
Constitution, or to explain why the principles embedded in the
constitutional text should be abandoned.
There might well be additional constitutional moves that we
can make. We appeal to the Constitution to help us identify how
we should live as well as how we must live. In doing so, we construct a Constitution of our own. Such constitutional constructions may take inspiration from the text but they need not make
claims that they are the only plausible interpretation of it. Such
constructions are not authoritative. Those who offer them cannot draw upon the larger authority of the founders and ask for
deference in their name. The construction of the text does rest
on its own persuasiveness as to what the Constitution might be.
Unsurprisingly, those who would reconstruct our understanding of the Constitution do not simply rely on the persuasiveness of their proffered understandings. They seek to stack
the deck in their favor. They alloy their constitutional arguments
with other appeals, and significantly they exploit the tools of political power to construct their preferred constitutional order. In
actual practice of American constitutionalism, the word is bound
to the polity not just through reasoned discourse but also
through political force, including that of judges exercising the
constructed and inherited power of judicial review. 31
The debate over originalism is about one particular feature
of American constitutionalism. Originalists and their critics attempt to provide an account of how the Constitution might operate as a legal rule such that it can be used within and justify the
practice of judicial review. To the extent that the Constitution
provides right answers to political questions, originalists and
their critics offer accounts of how best to determine those right
answers. That debate is not the sum total of constitutional scholarship. Goldford succeeds less in transcending the originalism
debate than in changing the subject. He does not offer a compelling alternative way to justify the practice of judicial review or
guide those who would seek to interpret and apply the Constitution, though he does help sharpen our understanding of how the
contending sides in the current debate differ. He is more successful in pointing us toward different questions that we might ask,
31. On the practice of constitutional construction, see KEITII E. WHIITINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
(1999).
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some of which are empirical (How is the constitutional text in
fact deployed to legitimate political action? How significant is
the Constitution as a source of political legitimacy in contemporary politics? How do we come to have the constitutional understandings and practice that we in fact have?) and some of which
are conceptual (How can we understand the notion of a constitutional people that transcends multiple generations? What are the
basic purposes of a constitution within a political system?). For
those interested in changing the subject from the debates over
judicial review, there are plenty of other features of American
constitutionalism worth exploring.

